Vol. 12, Nos. 51 & 52	Covering Cases Published in the Advance Sheets through Dec. 26, 2005

New Supreme Court Cases

• In Sanders, the Supreme Court held, by a 5-4 vote, that a death penalty was not rendered unconstitutional simply because the California state courts had ruled that two of the four aggravating factors used by the jury to find that the defendant was eligible for the death penalty were invalid, since the remaining two factors were sufficient to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
  
  
  
• In Collins, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s determination that a California trial court had unreasonably dismissed a Batson challenge to the striking of an African-American juror. The Court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit had “improperly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the state trial court,” in violation of the standards established under the AEDPA.
  
  
  
• In Chavis, a unanimous Supreme Court held that an inmate who waits more than three years between a ruling in a lower state court and an appeal to that state's supreme court has not pursued his claims with diligence and thus does not qualify for tolling of the one-year statute of limitations under the AEDPA.
  
  
• In a narrow and brief decision that sidestepped some of the broader federalism issues that were involved, a unanimous Supreme Court held, in Georgia, that the Eleventh Circuit had erred when it dismissed, on the grounds of sovereign immunity, a lawsuit brought by a paraplegic inmate who claimed that prison officials had violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
  
  

Mandatory Minimum Challenge Rejected

• In Angelos, the Tenth Circuit rejected, as expected, a series of challenges to the wisdom, fairness and constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences; but the case is significant because it led to huge notoriety and fired up a long-overdue nationwide debate about whether a 55-year prison sentence imposed on a first-time offender who was convicted of selling a few hundred dollars worth of marijuana was fair and just.

Fourth Amendment - Suppression Order Vacated

• In Dessesaure, the First Circuit reversed a suppression ruling previously granted by Judge Gertner of the D.Mass. in a controversial and highly publicized drug case where she found, after three days of hearings, that the evidence given by the police was “sloppy, inconsistent, and worse, not credible” and that the Government’s theory of the case was “legally preposterous” and made a “mockery” of the Fourth Amendment.
  
  
  

Brown v. Sanders, No. 04-980 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2006) (Justice Scalia)

In its latest attempt to clarify its own death penalty jurisprudence, the Supreme Court chose this highly fact-specific and technical case to establish a new and somewhat simplistic rule for capital cases which states: “An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances."

In so ruling, the Court reinstated the death sentence imposed on California inmate Ronald Sanders, even though two of the four aggravating factors cited by the jury in making him eligible for the death penalty were later found by the California Supreme Court to be invalid. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Scalia categorically concluded that the erroneous factors “could not” have “skewed" the sentence, and no constitutional violation occurred because the jury was able to give proper consideration to the same facts and circumstances through the remaining, valid factors upon which it relied.

Sanders was convicted of first-degree murder, of attempted murder, and robbery and burglary. At the guilt phase of his trial, the jury found four "special circumstances" under California law, each of which independently rendered him eligible for the death penalty. At the penalty phase, the jury was instructed to consider a list of sentencing factors relating to the defendant's background and the nature of the crime, including "the circumstances of the crime to which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true." The jury sentenced Sanders to death.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court set aside two of the four "special circumstances": the burglary-murder special circumstance under state merger law, and the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" special circumstance because it had previously found this standard unconstitutionally vague. However, it affirmed the death sentence, reading the Court's decision in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), to uphold a death penalty judgment despite invalidation of one of several aggravating factors.

The Supreme Court initially denied certiorari on direct appeal. However, Sanders then filed for federal habeas; and, after his habeas petition was denied by the district court, the Ninth Circuit reversed. In a decision reported at Sanders v. Woodford, 373 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. July 8, 2004), the Ninth Circuit concluded that Sanders had been unconstitutionally deprived of an "individualized death sentence.”

California then appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed. The majority conceded that the rule established in Zant and its progeny was “needlessly complex and incapable of providing for the full range of variations,” in part because it created a difficult-to-fathom sentencing distinction between the scheme followed in the so-called “weighing states” (where the only aggravating factors permitted to be considered by the sentencer were the specified eligibility factors) compared with that used in the so-called “non-weighing states” (where the sentencer is permitted to consider aggravating factors different from, or in addition to, the eligibility factors).

Therefore, “to simplify” the weighing/non-weighing scheme that has been created, the majority established its new rule which effectively says that the constitutionality of a capital sentence is not impacted by the invalidity of some of the special aggravating factors considered by the jury, so long as the remaining factors are sufficient (at least in the eyes of the Supreme Court) to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

Justices Stevens and Souter dissented, principally on the grounds that the majority’s new rule “is more likely to complicate than to clarify our capital sentencing jurisprudence”; and Justices Breyer and Ginsberg dissented, principally on the grounds that the majority’s new rule was “unrealistic, impractical, and legally unnecessary.”

Rice v. Collins, No. 04-52 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 2006) (Justice Kennedy)

In this case, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed another decision of the Ninth Circuit (its still-favorite punching-bag), and held that the Circuit had erred when it concluded, in Collins v. Rice, 365 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. April 8, 2004) (Collins I), that a California trial court had unreasonably dismissed a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) to the peremptory striking of an African-American juror.

The respondent, Steven Collins, was arrested in 1996 on state drug charges; and because he had been convicted of two prior felonies, the state charged him as a recidivist under California’s Three Strikes Law. At trial, the judge conducted voir dire and subsequently asked counsel to exercise their peremptory challenges. Of the three prospective African-American jurors out of a pool of twenty-three, the prosecutor struck two, both women.

Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor had impermissibly exercised the challenges against the two women on account of their race in violation of Batson. Finding a prima facie Batson violation, the judge asked the prosecutor to explain her reasons for the challenges.

The prosecutor claimed that one woman, Juror 16, had responded to a question by the judge in a flippant manner, and that the other, Juror 19, had a daughter with a drug problem. In addition, the prosecutor responded that both women were young (even though Juror 19 was not), potentially too tolerant of drug possession, single, and without ties to their community. Upon further questioning, the prosecutor acknowledged that gender may have played a role. When chastised for using gender as a factor, the prosecutor returned to her explanation that youth was important, even though other young jurors were allowed to serve.

The trial judge, noting that he was "prepared to give the district attorney the benefit of the doubt," refused to find a Batson violation. With regard to Juror 19, the court was satisfied with the prosecutor’s explanation that she had a family member with a drug problem. With regard to Juror 16, the court held that, although it had not observed the demeanor complained of, it was justified to excuse the potential juror for her alleged reaction to a question by the judge.

On appeal, Collins challenged only the strike of Juror 16. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that youth is not a forbidden class for purposes of Batson, and that in any event the prosecutor also relied on the juror’s demeanor. Collins filed a petition for review in the state Supreme Court, which was denied without comment. Proceeding pro se, Collins then sought federal habeas relief. He offered no new evidence, and the district court held that neither purported justification constituted mere pretext. The Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision in Collins I, then reversed, holding that the California Court of Appeal’s decision represented an unreasonable determination of the facts and was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

In reversing the decision in Collins I, the Supreme Court explained that under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal habeas court must find that a state court made an "unreasonable determination of facts" before it can overturn a state conviction and grant habeas relief. Here, the Court concluded, the reasons given by the state trial court for finding that the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to dismiss a black juror were not so unreasonable as to warrant habeas relief.

Under the AEDPA, as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), federal courts reviewing the credibility findings made by a state trial court in a Batson challenge may grant relief only if they determine that the state court’s conclusion was "an unreasonable determination of the facts." (This standard of review applies only to habeas petitions. On direct appeal from a state court, the standard of review is "clear error.")

A separate provision of the AEDPA, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), imposes an even higher standard on certain claims. It deems state-court factual findings presumptively correct; a habeas petitioner can overcome that presumption only with "clear and convincing" evidence. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider which of those two provisions of the AEDPA applied to the respondent’s case, explaining that the Ninth Circuit’s holding was untenable even under the lower standard of §2554(d)(2) because the state court’s findings were not unreasonable.

Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, explained that the Court had granted certiorari specifically because it was concerned that "in this habeas corpus case, a federal court set aside reasonable state-court determinations of fact in favor of its own debatable interpretation of the record."

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this highly fact-specific ruling is some dicta about the Batson ruling.
Justice Breyer issued a concurring opinion in which he restated his position, first expressed in Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (2005), that the Batson test and the peremptory challenge system generally should be reconsidered. Justice Souter, who was the author of the majority opinion in Miller-El, joined in Justice Breyer’s concurrence.

Evans v. Chavis, No. 04-721 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 2006) (Justice Breyer)

In yet another case that involved still another reversal of a Ninth Circuit decision, a unanimous Supreme Court held that California prisoner Reginald Chavis' Federal habeas claim fell outside the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) one year statute of limitations. The Court found that Chavis' three year delay in filing for an appeal to the California Supreme Court was not "reasonable" under California law, and thus did not qualify for tolling of the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) which allows a prisoner to discount the "time during which a properly filed application for Sate post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending." (Emphasis added).

In the past, the Court has emphasized that inmates must not delay too long while they are pursuing state challenges, or they risk being found to have wasted too much time in state court and thus not eligible to pursue their claims under the filing deadlines for a federal habeas challenge. (See, e.g., Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), where the Supreme Court held that (1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA's 1-year limitations period for the time between the lower court's adverse decision and the filing of a notice of appeal in the higher court; (2) in California, "unreasonable" delays are not timely; and (3) a California Supreme Court order denying a petition "on the merits" does not automatically indicate that the petition was timely filed.)

In the instant case, Chavis filed his initial state habeas petition on May 14, 1993. The trial court denied the petition, as did the California Court of Appeal on September 29, 1994. Chavis did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court until November 5, 1997. The petition was denied as untimely by the state court; but, in a decision reported at Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. May 10, 2004) (Chavis I), the Ninth Circuit concluded that Chavis’ California petition was still “pending” when he sought Federal habeas relief and therefore he was “entitled to tolling.” (Chavis I, id., at 926.)

After a review of the detailed and technical facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that California's system for habeas review is different from most other states: whereas most states require a notice of appeal within a finite time period, California requires only that a prisoner seek review within a "reasonable time."

Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted its ruling in Saffold; and it stated that it was "convinced” that the law does not permit a holding that Chavis' federal habeas petition was timely. “We have found no authority suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that [the delay in this case] . . . was ‘reasonable.’ Nor do we see how an unexplained delay of this magnitude could fall within the scope of the federal statutory word ‘pending’ as interpreted in Saffold.”

U.S. v. Georgia, No. 04-1203 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005) (Justice Scalia)

In this brief and far from momentous ruling, the Supreme Court held that a disabled state inmate may sue a state for money damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.) (“ADA”). The inmate, Tony Goodman, a paraplegic, claimed that prison officials grossly neglected his needs for mobility and personal hygiene and that his dependence on a wheelchair excluded him from the law library and recreational activities. He therefore brought a $1.2 million damage suit against various state officials, claiming violations of both his statutory and constitutional rights.

The Eleventh Circuit held that Goodman had the right to sue individual prison employees on the ground that their conduct violated Goodman’s constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment. The Circuit Court also allowed Goodman to sue the state for injunctive relief under the ADA. But the Court held that Goodman could not sue the State of Georgia, since such claims were barred by Georgia’s sovereign immunity as provided by the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to decide the validity of Title II's abrogation of state sovereign immunity.

A unanimous Court reversed and held that a state loses its immunity in such suits when it has engaged in conduct that “actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment” and in such cases “Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.”

However, emphasizing the narrow nature of the Court’s ruling, Justice Scalia said that it was unclear what conduct Goodman intended to allege in support of his Title II claims and to what extent the conduct underlying his constitutional claims also violated Title II. He then continued that while the Court has divided over the scope of Congress' “prophylactic” enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions.”

In the end, the Court returned the case to the to the lower courts, to allow Goodman to amend and clarify his challenge to prison conditions that he claims violate his rights under the ADA. Once a revised complaint is filed, the Court said, the lower courts could then determine, claim by claim, which prison practices do violate ADA's Title II, whether any such violations also violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether, if Title II is violated but the Fourteenth Amendment is not, the state loses its immunity as to any such claim. Thus, the Court left open the question of whether states would retain immunity to private lawsuits under ADA's government services protection if only that provision is violated, and the Fourteenth Amendment is not.

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