Vol. 10, No. 1
Covering Cases Published in the Advance Sheets through January 6, 2003

Note: The full text of all of the decisions noted below has been incorporated in our on-line data base which is available for subscribers only. Thus, while the names of some of the cases are highlighted in blue, they are not hypertext-linked to the official decision in this Visitor's Edition of Punch and Jurists.

Highlights of this Issue:

Apprendi

Anti-Terrorism

Child Pornography


Don’t miss our News From the Internet Section for information about a new site at www.regulations.gov for access to all Government regulations; and for information about a helpful search technique for those who use the Google search engine.

 


U.S. v. Martinez, No. 02-10018 (D.Mass. 12/12/02) (Judge Gertner)

The defendant in this case was indicted on five counts involving the illegal distribution of the drug known as ecstasy. The caption of one of those counts described that offense as “distribution resulting in serious bodily injury,” in violation of the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), even though the Government “neither alleged bodily injury nor presented any information or evidence on the subject to the grand jury.” The purpose of alleging serious bodily injury was to increase the sentencing penalties to which the defendant would be subject if he was convicted. The penalty provisions of § 841(b)(1)(C) establish two different sentencing ranges: probation to twenty years, in the case of simple distribution; and twenty years to life, in the case of aggravated distribution (i.e., where death or serious bodily injury results from the use of the drug).

The defendant moved to dismiss the count that alleged, in its caption, that serious bodily injury had occurred. The Government not only opposed the motion, it went one step further. It boldly argued that its allegation of serious bodily injury in the indictment was sufficient to transform the sentencing range for simple distribution into a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years, so long as it established, at sentencing and by a mere preponderance of the evidence, that some serious bodily injury had in fact occurred.

Judge Gertner dismissed the count at issue and emphatically concluded that the defendant was not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence “based on the allegations of serious bodily injury’.” Stating that the Government’s position was “to be charitable, creative,” she forcefully concluded that it was “wrong as a reading of § 841, wrong as an interpretation of Apprendi [v. New Jersey], wrong as an interpretation of Harris [v.U.S], and wrong as an interpretation of the Guidelines .” Of equal significance, her opinion contains an excellent summary of the holdings and the current boundaries of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi and Harris

Emphasizing that the Government had offered “no authority” for its novel interpretation of § 841, Judge Gertner commented: “The fact that the two separate statutory sentencing ranges in § 841(b)(1)(C) overlap at the magic number of twenty years does not transform the twenty-year floor of the higher enhanced range into a mandatory minimum sentencing factor that can be imported into the baseline range. . . . Were I to accept the government's invitation to statutory vivisection, ‘serious bodily injury’ would become ‘a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense’ in this case, which is constitutionally unacceptable.”

Judge Gertner also rejected the Government’s last-ditch efforts to salvage its position by suggesting that she utilize the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines to take its “serious bodily injury” argument into consideration. She explained that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 permits consideration of uncharged evidence - “but with the proviso - ‘unless otherwise specified’.” She noted that the language of the Guidelines “is explicit”: under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, where the “offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance,” the base offense level is increased to level 38. However, she concluded that the “offense of conviction” in this case would not “establish” that serious bodily injury took place “because the indictment does not charge bodily injury as an element of the offense.”


Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-1437 (6th Cir. 01/22/2003) (Per Curiam)

In August, 2002, Circuit Judge Damon Keith authored a searing indictment of a recently enacted INS policy that requires the holding of all “special interest” deportation hearings in secret whenever the Government asserts that the alien has some link to terrorism. With stinging criticism of that new policy, Judge Keith wrote, in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (Detroit Free Press I) (P&J, 08/05/2002), that the Bush administration had acted unlawfully in holding hundreds of such secret deportation hearings; and he questioned the administration’s commitment to an open democracy. In invalidating the blanket closure of all such “special interest” cases, Judge Keith wrote:

“Today, the Executive Branch seeks to take this safeguard away from the public by placing its actions beyond public scrutiny. Against non-citizens, it seeks the power to secretly deport a class if it unilaterally calls them ‘special interest’ cases. The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people's lives, outside the public eye, and behind a closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors. The First Amendment, through a free press, protects the people's right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately in deportation proceedings. When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation. The Framers of the First Amendment ‘did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.’ They protected the people against secret government.” (Detroit Free Press I, id., at 683). (Emphasis added) (Internal citations omitted).

That decision was quickly followed, in October, 2002, by a Third Circuit decision which addressed the same INS policy directive. In North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002) (P&J, 09/16/02), a divided panel from the Third Circuit upheld that Government’s right to hold such “special interest” deportation hearings in secret and concluded that neither the press nor the public have a constitutional right to attend deportation hearings of aliens suspected of having a connection to terrorist activities. The majority wrote: “We are unable to conclude that openness always plays a positive role in [Sept. 11-related] deportation hearings at a time when our nation is faced with threats of such profound and unknown dimension.” (North Jersey Media, id., at 220.)

In a strong dissent, Judge Scirica wryly observed that “deference is not a basis for abdicating our responsibilities under the First Amendment.” (North Jersey Media, id., at 226.)

Within two weeks of the New Jersey Media decision, the Government filed a petition for a rehearing en banc of the Detroit Free Press decision. Last week, on January 22, 2003, in an unsigned per curiam order, the Sixth Circuit declined to review Judge Keith’s decision. Now that the issue has been joined by two contradictory opinions, the stage has been set for an early appeal to the Supreme Court.


IN BRIEF


Alien Detention: Soto-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 228 F.Supp.2d 566 (M.D.Pa. 2002) - The court denied a writ of habeas corpus to a Mariel Cuban who has been awaiting deportation since 1997, on the grounds that his continued detention was not a violation of due process and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Arson: U.S. v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002) - Last week we noted a decision where the Sixth Circuit upheld an arson conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) of a pastor who burned his church, after concluding that the church was actively employed in commercial activities that had a sufficiently substantial effect on interstate commerce to justify a Federal prosecution. (U.S. v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2002)). In the instant case, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the convictions of a defendant who had deliberately set fire to five churches, on the grounds that none of the churches had sufficient connections with interstate commerce to support a federal case under the Church Arson Prevention Act (18 U.S.C. 247).

Collateral Attacks on Prior Convictions: U.S. v. Dominguez, No. 02-10106 (9th Cir. 1/21/2003) - The district court erred by improperly placing the burden of proof on the Government to establish that the defendant’s prior waivers of counsel had been valid, in a case where the defendant was challenging the constitutionality of those prior convictions.

Prison Issues: Brown v. Crowley, 312 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 2002) - A prisoner's claim of retaliation was actionable where he established that the prison's issuance of a major misconduct charge was motivated at least in part by the prisoner's filing of a complaint alleging embezzlement of his funds.

Sentencing: U.S. v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512 (1st Cir. 2002) - A special condition of supervised release imposed on a defendant convicted of income tax evasion, which prohibited him from using alcohol during supervision, was reasonably related to defendant's history and to goals of supervised release; and a requirement that the defendant attend a mental health treatment program as directed by the probation officer was not an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to a probation officer.


NEWS FROM THE INTERNET


Scorecard Of Published Federal Criminal Cases Reviewed By Our Staff:

Court

This Week

Year to Date

Since 1996

Courts of Appeal

44

44

16,551

District Courts

29

29

   8,967


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